William Slavoski v. Frank Pawlowski by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-7-2012 
William Slavoski v. Frank Pawlowski 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"William Slavoski v. Frank Pawlowski" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1449. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1449 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
   NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2694 
___________ 
 
 
WILLIAM SLAVOSKI,  
                      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
FRANK PAWLOWSKI; HUASCAR RIVERA; 
JOHN RICE; MERVIN RODRIGUEZ; 
 FRANCIS J. HACKEN; BRYON DEVLIN; 
 WILLARD OLIPHANT; PEDRO RIVERA 
 
___________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3-10-cv-02139) 
District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo  
___________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 6, 2012 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, GARTH, Circuit Judges, and 
PADOVA,∗
 
 Senior District Judge 
(Filed: February 7, 2012 ) 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
                                              
∗ The Honorable John R. Padova, Senior Judge, United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 United States Secret Service Agent William Slavoski filed a civil rights complaint 
(pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983) against employees of the Pennsylvania State Police 
(“PSP”), including Commissioner Frank Pawlowski, Mervin Rodriguez, John Rice, 
Francis Hacken, Bryon Devlin, Willard Oliphant, Huascar Rivera, and Pedro Rivera 
(collectively “Defendants”).  Slavoski alleged that Defendants violated his constitutional 
rights by accusing him of using a law enforcement computer database for unauthorized 
reasons, unlawfully targeting him, and retaliating against him when he filed formal 
complaints against them.  The District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 
claim, and denied Slavoski’s motion for reconsideration of that decision.  Slavoski 
appealed.  We will affirm. 
I. 
Background 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recount only the facts that are 
essential to our decision.  Slavoski accessed a criminal information databank on behalf of 
a member of the Kingston Police Department, Detective David Griffin.  Griffin had asked 
Slavoski to obtain information about a vehicle because Griffin believed that he was being 
stalked.  The databank showed that the vehicle was registered to defendant Willard 
Oliphant and his son Will.  At the time, Oliphant was employed by the Pennsylvania 
State Police as a captain.   
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 Apparently motivated by Slavoski’s inquiry on behalf of Griffin, defendant Bryan 
Devlin conducted an audit of the databank’s terminal less than two months later.  About a 
year later, defendant Mervin Rodriguez accused Slavoski of misusing the Commonwealth 
Law Enforcement Assistance Network (“CLEAN”) and improperly disseminating 
information from it to Griffin.  Rodriguez told Slavoski that he would be on probation for 
a year. 1
 Slavoski argues that Defendants acted in retaliation for his “innocent and lawful 
use” of the databank because it “exposed the Oliphant’s [sic] personally,” in violation of 
Slavoski’s First Amendment rights.  App. at 25.  He also argues that the audit was an 
unlawful search in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and that his Equal 
Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated.   
  Devlin, Rodriguez, Rivera, and Hacken also acquired Slavoski’s personal 
address by auditing the databank.  The Defendants continued to investigate Slavoski, and 
he remained on probation.   
II. 
Analysis 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this § 1983 civil rights 
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and this court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal of a final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a 
District Court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6).  See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  “To 
                                              
1 The probation that Mr. Rodriguez administered was a probation involving the 
use of the “CLEAN” network. 
 
4 
 
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. 
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).   
 We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Slavoski failed to state a claim 
of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment because he was put on probation for his 
alleged unauthorized use of the database before he made any complaints against the 
Pennsylvania State Police.  Therefore, even if we accept that filing those complaints was 
protected First Amendment activity, Slavoski failed to allege any facts demonstrating 
retaliatory action that occurred in response to that activity.  Moreover, actions taken by 
Defendants after Slavoski filed his complaints do not qualify as retaliatory actions.  See 
Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004) (“In general, 
constitutional retaliation claims are analyzed under a three-part test. Plaintiff must prove 
(1) that he engaged in constitutionally-protected activity; (2) that the government 
responded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity caused the retaliation.”).   
 We also agree with the District Court’s reasoning as to why Slavoski has failed to 
state a claim under the Fourth Amendment: even assuming that Slavoski had a subjective 
expectation of privacy as to the information he searched on the database at the computer 
terminal at his work, that expectation was objectively unreasonable.  See Minnesota v. 
Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95 (1990) (“[C]apacity to claim the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person who claims the protection of the 
Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.”) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 
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(1978) (“Obviously, however, a ‘legitimate’ expectation of privacy by definition means 
more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered.”).   
 The District Court’s reasoning as to why Slavoski failed to state a claim that 
Defendants violated his Equal Protection rights is also sound.  Slavoski did not allege any 
facts showing that he was treated differently than any similarly situated individuals, and 
even if he had, the decision as to how to deal with misuse of the databases was solely 
within the discretion of the Pennsylvania State Police.  See Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of 
Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 603 (2008) (“[T]reating like individuals differently is an accepted 
consequence of the discretion granted” when state action involves “discretionary 
decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments.”).   
III. 
Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s decision. 
 
